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Simon (1990) observed that recognition is a natural 
mechanism for helping people to solve problems, such as 
those found in chess, medical diagnosis, or reading. Simi-
larly, Axelrod (1985) postulated that recognition may be 
necessary for cooperation to be sustained in social interac-
tions. The recent development of the recognition heuristic 
has added inferences to this list of indirect applications 
of recognition memory (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, 
2002). According to the heuristic, recognition serves as 
a cue for making inferences about pairs of objects. The 
recognition heuristic can be quite accurate. These areas in-
clude, among others, making population inferences about 
German, U.S., and Swiss cities (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Pohl, 2006), se-
lecting stocks during a bull market (Borges, Goldstein, 
Ortmann, & Gigerenzer, 1999), and identifying National 
Hockey League players who have a high number of career 
points (Snook & Cullen, 2006).
Heuristics that use recognition as a predictor variable, 
such as the recognition heuristic, typically start with a 
judge’s binary recognition decision (Gigerenzer & Gold-
stein, 1996, 1999; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, 2002). 
In contrast, memory research often focuses on the process 
that leads up to the recognition decision (Raaijmakers & 
Shiffrin, 2002). Research examining these memorial pro-
cesses relies on laboratory experiments that have a defined 
learning phase in which participants study a list of items—
sometimes novel, sometimes common—followed by a test 
phase in which their recognition memory is tested on the 
items that they learned. The results from the laboratory 
typically reveal that signal detection theory is useful for 
understanding why correct and incorrect recognition de-
cisions are observed during memory experiments (Banks, 
1970). In particular, two factors give rise to both decisions 
during memory experiments: (1) the ability to detect the 
difference between the familiarity of learned and unlearned 
items (sensitivity); and (2) various response factors (crite-
rion location). Correct and incorrect recognition decisions, 
however, are more difficult to examine within the ecologi-
cal framework of the recognition heuristic and the broader 
class of fast and frugal heuristics. The difficulty arises be-
cause their ecological framework requires heuristics to be 
examined with a representative sample of stimuli drawn 
from an environment or reference class experienced outside 
of the laboratory (see Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Re-
search Group, 1999). Furthermore, the environment should 
be selected in such a way that the heuristic could sensibly 
be used in the environment to make inferences (see Giger-
enzer et al., 1999). Consequently, the researcher does not 
typically know the items a respondent has or has not expe-
rienced, making it difficult—if not impossible—to identify 
correct and incorrect recognition decisions.
The different methodology needed to study the recogni-
tion heuristic does not imply, however, that judges use a 
functionally different recognition process for items drawn 
from ecologically defined reference classes than for items 
learned in a laboratory setting. In fact, a recent fMRI study 
demonstrated a link between the recognition heuristic and 
recognition memory when areas of the medial parietal cor-
tex—areas typically associated with recognition memory—
were activated during the use of the recognition heuristic 
(Volz et al., 2006). A natural question is: How do these rec-
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ognition processes affect the accuracy of recognition as a 
predictor variable? In this article, I formally address this 
question by integrating signal detection theory with the rec-
ognition heuristic to show the effect that correct and incor-
rect recognition decisions have when recognition is used as 
a predictor cue. In doing so, I rely on the generalizability of 
signal detection theory as a model of recognition memory 
examined in the laboratory (see, e.g., Banks, 1970; Ratcliff, 
Clark, & Shiffrin, 1990; Shiffrin, Huber, & Marinelli, 1995) 
to the inferential paradigm of the fast and frugal program 
of research (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). Next, to facilitate the 
integration, I introduce the recognition heuristic, the em-
pirical evidence that supports its use, and the less-is-more 
effect that the recognition heuristic produces.
The Recognition Heuristic
The recognition heuristic is a single-variable decision rule 
that relies on recognition alone to make a judgment about an 
unknown target variable. When judges are confronted with 
a two-alternative, forced-choice question, such as choosing 
whether San Antonio or San Diego is more populous, the 
recognition heuristic states: If one of two objects is recog-
nized and the other is not, then infer that the recognized ob-
ject has the higher value with respect to the target variable.
In some domains, people who use this heuristic have 
a good chance of being correct. For example, Goldstein 
and Gigerenzer (2002) reported that the average Spear-
man correlation between American students’ recognition 
of German cities with a population over 100,000 and their 
respective population size is .60 (the recognition correla-
tion). This correlation occurs because people learn city 
names from mediators in the environment, such as the 
news media. The surrogate correlation between Ameri-
can students’ recognition of German city names and the 
number of mentions of those cities in the Chicago Tribune 
was .79. The mediators, in turn, can reflect other statis-
tical relationships. The citation rates of the city names 
have an ecological correlation of .70 with the populations 
of German cities (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002).1 The 
recognition heuristic, by exploiting the structure of infor-
mation diagrammed in Figure 1, is ecologically rational 
when inferring city populations or for any domain with 
the same information structure (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 
2002).
Judges with partial ignorance—those who have ex-
perience with some but not all of the objects in a speci-
fied reference class—benefit most from the recognition 
heuristic. For example, Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999) 
reported that the recognition heuristic can explain why 
Germans answered the San Diego/San Antonio question 
quite accurately—100% in their sample—whereas only 
62% of Americans answered the question correctly. This 
is because the recognition heuristic can be used only when 
just one of the items is recognized. American students rec-
ognized both cities and therefore resorted to other, less 
accurate cues to make an inference. When given a larger 
test bank of questions, partially ignorant judges can capi-
talize on their ignorance when the recognition heuristic is 
paired with a knowledge heuristic that follows the process 
diagrammed in Figure 2. Possible heuristics that follow 
this procedure include “take the best,” “take the last,” and 
“minimalist” (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Together, 
these heuristics give rise to a less-is-more effect, in which 
less knowledge or experience can be beneficial (see 
Gigerenzer, 2004; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996, 1999; 
Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, 2002).2
To explain how and why the less-is-more effect can 
emerge, Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999, 2002) derived 
the expected accuracy of judges who used the recognition 
heuristic when given an inferential test on pairs of ob-
jects. During the test, judges had to identify which object 
had a larger value on a target variable, such as population. 
The pairs were formed in such a way that the individual 
objects were a representative sample of a well-defined 
population of objects or reference class with N objects 
(e.g., German cities with over 100,000 inhabitants). A 
representative sample has the property that individual 
stimuli are equally likely to be selected (with replace-
ment) from the reference class (Brunswik, 1955; Dhami, 
Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & 
Kleinbölting, 1991).3
The recognition heuristic divides the N objects into 
two groups: n recognized objects and N  n novel ob-
jects. If a person is confronted with a randomly drawn 
pair of items from N(N  1)/2 of the possible pairs, then 
the recognition heuristic can be expected to be used for 
2n(N  n)/[N(N  1)] proportion of the pairs, where one 
item is recognized and the other is not.4
The recognition validity reflects the recognition correla-
tion (see Figure 1) and is the proportion of times that the 
recognized object has a higher value on the target variable:
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The variable R is the number of pairs that would lead to 
the correct inference, and W is the number of pairs that 
would lead to the incorrect inference, given a set of recog-
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Figure 1. The ecological rationality of the recognition heuristic. 
In some domains, recognition of objects can be correlated with an 
unknown target variable (e.g., city population). This is because 
judges experience objects via mediators in the environment (e.g., 
newspapers), and the mediators reflect the target variable (e.g., 
more populous cities tend to be in the news more often). From 
“Models of Ecological Rationality: The Recognition Heuristic,” 
by D. G. Goldstein and G. Gigerenzer, 2002, Psychological Review, 
109, p. 78. Copyright 2002 by the American Psychological Asso-
ciation. Adapted with permission. 
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nized and novel items. Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) 
suggested that this validity corresponds to Brunswik’s 
(1955) ecological validity, in which the ecological cue 
validity is the true relative frequency of any object, p, 
having a larger value on the target variable than any other 
object, q, in a reference class in which p has a positive 
cue value on the particular cue and q does not (Giger-
enzer et al., 1991). Typically, the ecological cue validity 
should be defined independently of any particular person 
(see Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, note 1). Goldstein 
and Gigerenzer (2002) argued that recognition validity 
is different from other ecological validities in that the 
relationship between the target variable and the cue is 
mediated by the structure of the environment. A second 
difference that I will return to is that recognition validity 
is not defined independently of a person’s psychological 
or memorial processes.
For the set in which neither object will be recognized, 
the judge must guess (see Figure 2). This is expected to 
happen for [(N  n)][(N  (n  1)]/[N(N  1)] propor-
tion of the pair with an expected accuracy of ½. Finally, a 
knowledge-based rule can be used for the remaining pairs 
in which both items are recognized [n(n  1)/N(N  1)] 
proportion of the time. This collapses across the subset 
of objects that the knowledge heuristic does and does not 
discriminate among (see Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, 
note 1). According to Figure 2, the knowledge heuristic 
discriminates between objects when one has a positive cue 
and the other does not; otherwise, it does not discriminate, 
and judges must guess. The expected accuracy for the pairs 
of items sent to the knowledge heuristic reflects this con-
cept. It is the probability of a correct inference given that 
both items are recognized, ;. Only in the limit when the 
knowledge heuristic has perfect discrimination is ; the cue 
validity as defined in Equation 1. In all other cases, ; is a 
weighted average between the cue validity and 1⁄2 in which 
the weights are determined by the discrimination rate of 
the knowledge heuristic.5
Summing the proportion of correct inferences for the 
recognition heuristic, guessing, and the knowledge heuris-
tic produces the expected proportion of correct inferences, 
P, for the given reference class,
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Using Equation 2, P can be plotted as a function of 
n, the number of items a judge has recognized. Setting 
N  100 and (  .8, the curves in Figure 3 show this 
for four different levels of ;. Goldstein and Gigerenzer 
(1999) illustrated the predictions with a story about three 
brothers with different levels of experience who take 
this inferential test. The youngest brother, who had no 
experience, recognized none of the objects (n  0), had 
to guess on all the inferences, and was correct 50% of 
the time (see the dot on the left side of Figure 3). The 
middle brother had some experience and recognized half 
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Figure 2. A flow diagram of knowledge heuristics that use the 
recognition heuristic in the first step. Typically, these algorithms 
include “take the best,” “take the last,” and “minimalist.” The 
discrimination rule for these knowledge heuristics specifies that 
the judge choose the object with a “” cue value when it is paired 
with an object whose cue value is “” or “?”. From “Reasoning 
the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Rationality,” by 
G. Gigerenzer and D. G. Goldstein, 1996, Psychological Review, 
103, p. 653. Copyright 1996 by the American Psychological As-
sociation. Adapted with permission.
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Figure 3. The less-is-more effect. The graph displays the pro-
portion of correct inferences in solid lines when (  .8 at four 
levels of ;. When the knowledge validity ; is .5, .6, or .7, a less-is-
more effect occurs. The performance of the three brothers is in-
dicated by the three points on the curve for ;  .6. From “Models 
of Ecological Rationality: The Recognition Heuristic,” by D. G. 
Goldstein and G. Gigerenzer, 2002, Psychological Review, 109, 
p. 79. Copyright 2002 by the American Psychological Association. 
Adapted with permission.
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of the objects (n  50). He also had extra cue knowledge 
so that when he recognized both cities, he was correct 
60% of the time (;  .6). In this case, using Equation 2, 
the middle brother would score 68% on the test (see the 
middle dot in Figure 3). The oldest brother had extensive 
experience with the reference class (n  100). Conse-
quently, he could not use recognition and instead relied 
on cue knowledge. His cue knowledge was similar to that 
of the middle brother, so he would be correct 60% of 
the time and his score of 60% on his test reflected this 
(see the rightmost dot in Figure 3). Hence, the scores of 
the middle and oldest brothers exhibit the less-is-more 
effect: The middle brother benefited from partial igno-
rance and scored 8% better than the more knowledgeable 
brother. In general, to find the less-is-more effect, the 
recognition validity must be greater than the accuracy of 
the knowledge heuristics ((  ;); otherwise, the maxi-
mal performance will always be at n  N (see Goldstein 
& Gigerenzer, 2002).
Do judges actually use the recognition heuristic? Gold-
stein and Gigerenzer (2002) reported that when making 
an inference about the more populous of two German 
cities, American college students chose the recognized 
city in 90% of all possible cases. Other studies (Bröder 
& Eichler, 2006; Newell & Shanks, 2004; Pachur & Hert-
wig, 2006; Pohl, 2006) have addressed whether recogni-
tion is used as a single variable predictor. Results from 
these studies indicate that when judges do not have direct 
knowledge about the target variable (i.e., judges use a 
probabilistic mental model; see Gigerenzer et al., 1991), 
they use recognition as a cue to make an inference. Fur-
thermore, as the cue validity of recognition increases, the 
likelihood that recognition is used as a single variable 
predictor increases.
However, as knowledge of conflicting cues increases, 
the noncompensatory status of the recognition heuris-
tics is also mitigated (Bröder & Eichler, 2006; Newell & 
Shanks, 2004; Oppenheimer, 2003; Pohl, 2006; Richter & 
Spath, 2006). Regardless, to use recognition as a binary 
predictor, whether in a single- or multiple-variable heu-
ristic, judges must first generate a recognition decision. 
These decisions do not map directly onto past experience. 
Instead, they depend on judges’ sensitivity to the differ-
ence between the familiarity of experienced versus novel 
items and their goals at the time of making their inference. 
Referring to Figure 1, these dependencies imply that me-
morial explanations other than an imperfect assessment 
of all possible mediators may explain why the surrogate 
correlation is not perfect. Integrating the recognition heu-
ristic with signal detection theory reveals one possible 
explanation for the imperfect surrogate correlation and 
can explain how recognition memory processes affect in-
ferential performance.
Integrating the Recognition Heuristic and 
Signal Detection Theory
The recognition heuristic makes an implicit assumption 
that recognition decisions perfectly reflect the split be-
tween experienced and novel items. Goldstein and Giger-
enzer (2002) stated “Thus, with the term recognition, we 
divide the world into the novel and the previously experi-
enced” (p. 77). However, judges are unlikely to both rec-
ognize all experienced objects and not recognize (reject) 
all novel objects.
In fact, the research Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999, 
2002) cited as evidence for the remarkable ability and ac-
curacy of recognition memory also directly acknowledges 
that recognition is fallible (see Craik & McDowd, 1987; 
Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989; Shepard, 1967; Stand-
ing, 1973). For example, Craik and McDowd and Jacoby 
et al. reported nonzero miss and false alarm rates for their 
respective recognition experiments. Shepard found that 
when respondents learned words and were later tested in 
his forced-choice paradigm on what they had learned, they 
responded correctly 88.4% of the time; with sentences, 
they were correct 89% of the time; and with pictures, they 
were correct 99.7% of the time.
Shepard (1967) showed that two classes of models might 
account for the observed data: (1) a signal detection frame-
work where recognition is a function of a continuous con-
struct and judges use an optimal criterion; and (2) a two-
state threshold model where recognition is a function of 
a binary all-or-none process. Assuming no response bias, 
both models can account for the errors and the differences 
among stimuli as a function of the judges’ sensitivity. Both 
models can be incorporated into the recognition heuristic.
Schooler and Hertwig (2005) have developed one pos-
sible high-threshold account with ACT–R. Global memory 
models, in comparison, embody the signal detection frame-
work and have been successful in accounting for a range of 
different phenomena (Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 2002). Ex-
amples include MINERVA-2 and MINERVA-DM (Dough-
erty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999; Hintzman, 1988), REM (Shif-
frin & Steyvers, 1997), SAM (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984), 
and TODAM (Murdock, 1997). In general, these models 
presume that when a judge is shown a stimulus, a repre-
sentation of the stimulus is formed in a memory probe. The 
probe is then compared with each item in memory, giving 
rise to a continuous level of activation or familiarity.6 If the 
familiarity is above a criterion value, the judge decides the 
stimulus is old (he has recognized the item). If the familiar-
ity is below the criterion, the judge decides the stimulus is 
new (he has not recognized the item).
From this perspective, the judge’s familiarity with 
items from a reference class is correlated by means of 
the environmental mediators of the target variable (e.g., 
population size). During the inferential test, the judge 
must transform his familiarity into a binary decision in 
order to use recognition as a predictor variable. To make 
the model as general as possible, I do not use any spe-
cific global memory model but instead use the more basic 
Gaussian signal detection model. Furthermore, to keep 
as much of the recognition heuristic intact as possible, I 
assume that the use of memory is comparable to a detec-
tion task. Specifically, when judges are presented with 
two stimuli (e.g., San Antonio and San Diego) and want 
to make an inference about some target variable (e.g., city 
size) based on recognition, they first look at one stimu-
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lus (San Antonio), decide whether it is old or new, and 
then turn to the remaining stimulus and decide whether 
it is old or new.7 Each experienced item can be either 
correctly identified as old (hit) or incorrectly identified 
as new (miss). If the item is novel, then it can be either 
incorrectly identified as old (false alarm) or correctly 
identified as new (correct rejection).
These distribution-free, detection-based assumptions 
elicit novel predictions. When judges do not make recog-
nition mistakes, there are three possible pair types. The 
recognition heuristic operates on the (hit, correct rejec-
tion) pairs. The guessing component is used on the (cor-
rect rejection, correct rejection) pairs, and the knowledge-
based rules are used on the (hit, hit) pairs. As the rate of 
mistakes increases, the number of possible pair types in-
creases from 3 to 10, and the distribution of pairs among 
these pair types changes.8 The first column of Table 1 il-
lustrates the 10 different possible pair types.
The specific component—recognition heuristic, guess-
ing, or knowledge heuristic—that handles each of the 10 
pair types is identified in the second column. To calcu-
late the proportion of pairs for each of the 10 pair types 
using the signal detection model, the number of objects 
experienced, ne, will be used, where the subscript “e” in-
dicates the change from number recognized to number 
experienced. This is because the framework now predicts 
the recognition of objects on the basis of experience. The 
variables h and f represent the hit and false alarm rates, 
respectively. To illustrate the calculations, consider the 
pairing when both items are hits. There are hne items that 
are expected to be a hit for the first item and, once one 
item is removed from this set, hne  1 items are left for 
the second item.9 The expected number of pairs in which 
both items are hits, therefore, is hne(hne  1). Dividing 
that expression by the total number of possible pairs, 
N(N  1)/2, produces the expected proportion of (hit, hit) 
pairs. The remaining expressions are found in a similar 
manner. The equations are shown in the third column of 
Table 1.
The expected accuracy associated with each pairing 
can also be derived. The accuracy of the recognition heu-
ristic depends on which of the four pair types it is fed. 
Table 1 
The 10 Possible Pair Types That Judges’ Recognition Decisions Can Produce
 
Pairs
  
Heuristic
  
Proportion of Pairs
 Expected Proportion 
Correct
Hit, correct rejection Recognition
2 1
1
hn f N n
N N
e e 	  	
 	 
Miss, false alarm Recognition
2 1
1
 	  	
 	
h n f N n
N N
e e 1  
Hit, miss Recognition
2
1
2 2h h n
N N
 	
 	
e 1⁄2
False alarm, correct rejection Recognition
2
1
2 2f f N n
N N
 	  	
 	
e 1⁄2
Correct rejection, correct rejection Guess
1 1 1
1
 	  	  	  	 §© ¶¸
 	
f N n f N n
N N
e e 1⁄2
Miss, miss Guess
1 1 1
1
 	  	 §© ¶¸
 	
h n h n
N N
e e 1⁄2
Miss, correct rejection Guess
2 1 1
1
 	  	  	
 	
h n f N n
N N
e e 1⁄2
Hit, hit Knowledge
hn hn
N N
e e  	
 	
1
1

Hit, false alarm Knowledge
2
1
hn f N n
N N
e e 	
 	 z  (1 z)
1⁄2
False alarm, false alarm Knowledge
f N n f N n
N N
 	  	 §© ¶¸
 	
e e 1
1
1⁄2
Note—The second column identifies which heuristic judges would use to arrive at an answer for each pair. The third 
column gives the proportion of pairs of each type for a given reference class with N objects, ne objects experienced by 
a judge, and hit and false alarm rates h and f, respectively. The fourth column gives the expected accuracy of each pair 
type.
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However, the recognition validity, (, cannot be used; the 
cue validity must be independent of the judge’s recogni-
tion ability. Consequently, I used the cue validity of the 
previously experienced and novel items, . The value 
of  is the ecological validity of experience indepen-
dent of any psychological or memorial process within 
the judge. It reflects the true environmental correlation 
between environmental mediators and the target variable 
(see Figure 1). Hypothetically, we could arrive at  if we 
could generate a list of German cities with more than 
100,000 citizens that a typical judge might have encoun-
tered by reading the Chicago Tribune. More than likely, 
this list would not be a comprehensive list of cities from 
the reference class, and, according to past analyses, it 
would probably tend to include more of the larger cit-
ies (see Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). Using this list, 
the number of pairs that would lead to a correct infer-
ence, R, and an incorrect inference, W, could be found. 
Like the cue validity of cues in the environment (e.g., 
whether a city has a soccer team or not), this cue validity 
is derived directly from the structure of the environment 
using Equation 1.
Of the four pairings that enter the recognition heuristic, 
only (hit, correct rejection) retains the expected accuracy 
of . The second pairing, (false alarm, miss), has a differ-
ent expected accuracy. If a judge accurately recognized 
both items, then this pair would also have gone into the 
recognition heuristic and retained  as the expected accu-
racy. However, now the novel item, false alarm, has been 
identified as recognized and the experienced item, miss, 
has been identified as not recognized, and the recogni-
tion heuristic would therefore pick the false alarm as the 
item with a higher target variable. Thus, referring to Equa-
tion 1, the W pairs used to calculate  would now lead to 
the correct inference, whereas the R pairs would lead to 
the incorrect inference. This results in an expected accu-
racy for (false alarm, miss) of 1.
The remaining two pairs, (hit, miss) and (false alarm, 
correct rejection), also have an expected accuracy differ-
ent from . Each of these two pairs comprises a correct 
and an incorrect detection. Consider first the (hit, miss) 
pair. A particular item is correctly recognized as old with a 
probability of h and is incorrectly identified as new with a 
probability 1  h. The recognition heuristic will produce 
the correct response for a (hit, miss) pairing only when 
the higher valued item is a hit and the lower valued item 
is a miss. This happens with a probability of h(1  h). 
The opposite can also happen. The higher valued item 
can be missed and the lower valued item can be correctly 
recognized, producing an incorrect inference. This par-
ticular pairing of a (hit, miss) also occurs with probability 
(1  h)h. Thus, a (hit, miss) pairing produces a correct 
inference half of the time and an incorrect inference half 
of the time. Similar logic holds for the (false alarm, cor-
rect rejection) pair.
For the next three pairs (correct rejection, correct re-
jection), (correct rejection, miss), and (miss, miss), the 
guessing rule would be employed. For all three of these 
pair types, the judge is expected to be correct half of the 
time.
Judges would use a knowledge-based heuristic for the 
remaining pairs when both items in a pair were recognized 
(see bottom three rows of Table 1). Although the cue va-
lidity of the knowledge cues—such as whether a city has a 
soccer team—is defined independently of the recognition 
ability of a judge, the probability of a correct inference 
given that both items are recognized (;), is not. To derive 
the expected accuracy of these items, I instead use , the 
probability of a correct inference given that both items are 
experienced. In this case, only the original pairing (hit, 
hit) would retain the expected accuracy of . The items in 
the pair with two false alarms are actually novel, so this 
pair has the lowest accuracy, 1⁄2.
Interestingly, the remaining pair type, (hit, false alarm), 
can benefit indirectly from experience. It can have an ex-
pected accuracy as high as  or as low as 1⁄2. To see why, 
consider Table 2, which models a hypothetical judge’s ex-
perience with 20 items (a–t), recognition of the same 20 
items, and knowledge of five cues for 20 items. The objects 
are displayed in descending order in terms of rank on the 
basis of a hypothetical target variable. For example, object 
a might be the city in a country with the largest popula-
tion, and object t might be the city with the 20th largest 
population. The person has experienced 10 of the objects, 
as indicated by a “” in the experience column. The “” in 
the experience column indicates that the objects were novel. 
For these novel objects, the judge also has no binary cue 
Table 2 
A Hypothetical Person’s Experience and Recognition of a 
Reference Class of 20 Objects (a–t) and Level of Knowledge of 
Five Knowledge Cues
Cue
Rank  Object  Experience  Recognition  1  2  3  4  5
1 a  Hit     
2 b  Hit     
3 c  Miss     
4 d  CR ? ? ? ? ?
5 e  Hit     
6 f  Hit     
7 g  CR ? ? ? ? ?
8 h  Hit     
9 i  FA ? ? ? ? ?
10 j  Miss     
11 k  Hit     
12 l  CR ? ? ? ? ?
13 m  CR ? ? ? ? ?
14 n  Miss     
15 o  Hit     
16 p  CR ? ? ? ? ?
17 q  FA ? ? ? ? ?
18 r  CR ? ? ? ? ?
19 s  CR ? ? ? ? ?
20 t  FA ? ? ? ? ?
Note—The objects are ordered according to a hypothetical target vari-
able. A “” or “” in the experience column indicates whether the object 
is experienced or novel, respectively. The Recognition column identifies 
the recognition decision at the time of the inferential test. CR, correc-
tion recognition; FA, false alarm. A “,” “,” or “?” in the cue columns 
indicates a positive, negative, or unknown cue value, respectively.
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knowledge. This is indicated by a “?” in the cue columns. 
The recognition column identifies the classification of the 
person’s recognition decision at the time of the inferential 
test. As Table 2 shows, there are two types of (hit, false 
alarm) pairs. Pair (a, i) is one. For this pair, the knowledge 
heuristic would infer item a as the larger item and be correct 
on the basis of the discrimination rule detailed in Figure 2, 
in which judges choose the positive cue over negative and 
unknown cue values. In fact, the hit item will always be cho-
sen in a pair of this type whenever at least one positive cue 
value is associated with it in memory. Table 2 reveals that 
these (hit, false alarm) pairs are sampled from pairs that the 
experience cue would have differentiated among (i.e., one 
item has a “” and the other a “” in the experience col-
umn) and that the hit choices are consistent with the choices 
that the experience cue would have led to. As a result, this 
subset has an expected accuracy of . However, some of 
the hit items (such as b and f ) have no positive cue values. 
This can occur because of the structure of the environment 
or the limited cue knowledge of the judge. Either way, the 
discrimination rule (i.e., when both objects lack a positive 
cue value, guess) dictates that the judge would have to guess 
on this subset of (hit, false alarm) pairs. Thus, the expected 
accuracy for the (hit, false alarm) pair is a weighted aver-
age between  and 1⁄2, with the weight determined by z, the 
proportion of experienced items with at least one positive 
cue value.
To find the expected proportion of correct inferences for 
each pair type, multiply the expected proportion of pairs 
(column 3 of Table 1) by the accuracy rate (column 4 of 
Table 1). Table 3 provides a summary of the variables intro-
duced for this derivation. To produce more precise predic-
tions, I assume that novel and experienced stimuli give rise 
to a familiarity, t, that is normally distributed. For scaling 
purposes, the novel stimuli have a mean of 0, and experi-
enced stimuli have a mean of d . The parameter d  indexes 
the level of sensitivity to the difference between the famil-
iarity of experienced versus novel items. As d  increases, 
judges become more sensitive to the difference between the 
two types of stimuli. Shepard’s (1967) set of recognition 
experiments—using pictures, statements, and words—pro-
vides a convenient example of how sensitivity can vary 
according to item type. Interesting or important items can 
also induce higher levels of sensitivity within a domain (see, 
e.g., Gronlund, Ohrt, Dougherty, Perry, & Manning, 1998). 
Additionally, sensitivity can vary among domains on the 
basis of meaningfulness, similarity, and pleasantness of the 
objects, among other things (see also Glanzer & Adams, 
1985). Finally, sensitivity can vary among people for a given 
domain. For example, repetitions and study time can im-
prove discrimination. Consider two geography students, one 
diligent and one lackluster. The diligent student will study 
her list of cities more frequently and for longer periods of 
time, becoming more sensitive to differences between expe-
rienced and novel items, whereas the lackluster student will 
study the same list once and again only briefly the morning 
before the exam and would thus be less sensitive.
I also make a simplifying assumption that both distribu-
tions of familiarity have an equal variance, À2, set at 1.10 
At test, judges have a criterion, k, set at one point along 
the possible values that the familiarity could take. The rule 
for deciding whether a given item is old or new can now 
be formally stated as: Respond “old” if and only if t > k; 
if not, respond “new.”
With the distributions specified, the probability of a hit 
for a given value of d  and k can be calculated as h  
1  (k  d ), where the function (•) represents the 
standardized normal cumulative distribution function. 
The miss rate, m, is m  (1  h). The false alarm rate is 
f  1  (k), and the correct rejection rate is c  1  f. 
The expected proportion of each type of pairings can now 
be calculated given a value for k and d .
Besides changing the applicability of the recognition 
heuristic, experience can also change the recognition re-
sponse process. Prior experience with the reference class 
increases the number of items the judge has experienced 
(ne) prior to the test, thus making it a priori more likely 
during a representative test that the judge will be shown 
a previously experienced item. Within signal detection 
theory, a judge should capitalize on this by picking which-
ever decision (old or new) has the greater likelihood given 
his familiarity p(old | familiarity) or p(new | familiarity) 
and adjust his response criterion according to his level of 
prior experience. Thus, a judge with little to no experi-
ence would be fairly conservative in deciding whether he 
recognizes an item, but as his experience increased, his 
criterion would become more liberal.
To see this formally, the comparison can be stated in 
terms of the posterior odds,
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where the first component on the far right side is the likeli-
hood ratio, p(familiarity | old)/p(familiarity | new), and the 
second component is the prior odds, p(old)/p(new). The 
likelihood ratio of the data is found using the distributions 
specified for the experienced and novel items. The represen-
tative sampling of the stimuli in the inferential test—where 
Table 3 
Parameters and Variables Used for the Signal Detection Analysis
 Variable  Description  
N Number of objects in a specified reference class
n Number of objects recognized in the reference class
( Validity of recognition in the reference class
; Probability of a correct inference in the reference class, 
given that both items have been recognized
ne Number of objects experienced in the reference class
 Ecological validity of experience in the reference class
 Probability of a correct inference in the reference class 
given that both items have been experienced
h Hit rate
m Miss rate
f False alarm rate
c Correct rejection rate
t Familiarity of an item
Å d   Sensitivity to the difference between the familiarity of  
   experienced and that of novel items  
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all objects are equally likely to occur in a pair (see Giger-
enzer et al., 1991)—specifies the prior odds for the judge. 
For example, if an observer has experienced only 40 of 100 
items in a reference class, the prior odds of an old item’s ap-
pearing on the inferential test are .4/.6. More generally,
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To maximize the probability of a correct detection, a 
judge’s decision rule for recognition must be
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Substituting Equation 4 into Equation 3 and taking the 
logarithm, the response can be reformulated in terms of a 
likelihood ratio observer who adopts a criterion with
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with the constraint that 0 < ne < N. The same decision rule 
can now be stated in terms of the likelihood ratio
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The likelihood-ratio observer is consistent with recent em-
pirical evidence from recognition experiments (see Glan-
zer, Adams, Iverson, & Kim, 1993; Shiffrin & Steyvers, 
1997). This strategy can also be understood as adaptive. It 
maximizes the probability of correctly detecting whether 
an item is old or new and minimizes the interference that 
imperfect recognition memory would have on the rec-
ognition heuristic. To illustrate this, Figure 4 shows that 
the recognition error rate follows an inverted U centered 
around ne  50 for three different levels of d .
An alternative strategy is to keep the criterion fixed. 
The dashed lines in Figure 4 show the effects this strategy 
would have on the error rate for three levels of a centered 
criterion (1, 0, and 1) holding d  constant at 0.5.12 The 
error rate for these strategies is a linear function of experi-
ence whose slope depends on how liberal the judge is in 
making a positive recognition decision. These error rates 
reveal that this decision rule is maladaptive and would lead 
to more recognition errors across all levels of experience, 
resulting in decreased inferential accuracy. A third class of 
criterion strategies, not shown in Figure 4, would be that 
of a respondent who grows more conservative with experi-
ence. This in effect would minimize the probability of a cor-
rect detection and would produce an upright U in Figure 4 
(not shown). This does not seem very adaptive or plausible 
given the stated goal of inferential accuracy in the task.13 
Furthermore, the strategy would lead to odd predictions re-
garding the procedures outlined in Figure 2. For example, 
a complete expert (ne  N ) would completely neglect his 
knowledge and guess on 100% of the pairs. Taken together, 
this implies that the ecologically based response rule con-
sistent with a Bayesian observer would allow a judge to 
fully exploit the ecological correlation in the environment 
and be ecologically rational (Gigerenzer, 2001).
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
Number of Objects Experienced (ne)
Re
co
g
n
it
io
n
 E
rr
o
r R
at
e
d = 2.0
d = 1.0
d = 0.5
Criterion = 1
Criterion = 0
Criterion = –1
Figure 4. Hypothetical error rates for judges who adopt two 
different response strategies. The first strategy is to adjust the 
response criterion according to the level of experience, a Bayesian 
observer. The inverse U curves in the figure illustrate this strat-
egy. At low levels of experience, judges are most conservative in 
deciding that they recognize an object; they grow more liberal 
with experience. This strategy minimizes the number of recog-
nition errors.With increases in d , the error rate decreases. The 
second strategy is to fix the response criterion. The dashed lines 
show the predicted error rate for three different levels of criteria 
when d   0.5. The criterion values shown are centered so that a 
criterion of 0 indicates a criterion exactly between the two distri-
butions. All possible fixed criterion strategies can be derived from 
the figure using the tangent of the inverted U of a given Bayesian 
observer. These fixed-criterion judges commit a large number of 
errors regardless of experience.
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Figure 5. The average ( as a function of d  averaged across all 
levels of experience for four different levels of  (.6, .7, .8, and .9). 
Lower levels of sensitivity can bring about substantial decrements 
to the accuracy of their inferences.
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The Impact of Recognition Sensitivity on 
Inferential Accuracy
With this level of specification, the impact of d  on the 
judge’s inferential accuracy can be assessed. Besides an 
imperfect assessment of all possible mediators that con-
trol a judge’s experience in the environment, the model 
attributes sensitivity as a second psychological source for 
the imperfect surrogate correlation. To demonstrate this, 
I calculated the average predicted recognition validity, (, 
from the model using the four pairs that the judge would 
answer using the recognition heuristic (see Table 1). Spe-
cifically, I set N  100 and calculated ( for each level 
of ne as a function of d  for four different levels of  (.6, 
.7, .8, and .9) when there was a nonzero probability of 
employing the recognition heuristic. Figure 5 shows the 
average ( averaged across ne. Lower levels of sensitivity 
can bring about substantial decrements to the accuracy 
of recognition-based inferences. For example, a d  with a 
value of 0.5 decreases an experience validity from   .8 
to a recognition validity of (  .59; a d  of 1.0 decreases 
it to (  .63; and a d  of 2.0 decreases it to (  .70.
With its impact on both the recognition and knowledge 
heuristics, the recognition process also influences the less-
is-more effect. With N  100 and   .8, the panels in 
Figure 6 plot the predicted proportion of correct inferences 
as a function of experience, ne, when judges take the same 
inferential test described earlier. Three values of d Å(0.5, 
1.0, and 2.0) are varied across the columns, and three val-
ues of z (1⁄3, 2⁄3, or 1) are represented in the rows. Within 
each panel, there are four different levels of , which is 
the probability of a correct inference when both items are 
experienced. Recall that judges are making recognition 
decisions to maximize the probability of a correct detec-
tion; therefore, the criterion, k, changes with each level 
of experience. As a result of this response rule, the oldest 
and youngest brothers for all levels of d  and z have the 
same scores as their counterparts in Figure 3. The bottom 
two rows of Figure 6 illustrate that decreasing sensitivity 
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Figure 6. A reanalysis of the less-is-more effect assuming an equal-variance Gaussian signal detection model of the recogni-
tion process. The plots show different levels of sensitivity, d , and the proportion of experienced items with at least one positive 
cue, z. Three values of d  are varied across the columns and three values of z are varied up the rows. Within each panel, there 
are four different levels of B. Judges are making recognition decisions so as to maximize the probability of a correct detection; 
therefore, the criterion, k, changes with each level of experience. The bottom two rows of the figure illustrate that decreasing sen-
sitivity (from right to left) can mitigate the less-is-more effect and give way to the less counterintuitive more-is-more effect. In the 
top row, the knowledge heuristics benefit indirectly from the judges’ false alarms and help to maintain the less-is-more effect.
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(from right to left) can mitigate the less-is-more effect and 
give way to the less counterintuitive more-is-more effect. 
The less-is-more effect is not existent for   .7 for all 
six panels in the bottom two rows. Even for   .6, where 
the less-is-more effect tends to persist, the magnitude of 
the effect is diminished. Consider, for example, the middle 
brother when d   2.0 and z  2⁄3. He is predicted to score 
63%, a mere three-point advantage over his more expe-
rienced brother. Recall that, originally, partial ignorance 
gave the middle brother an eight-point advantage.
The signal detection model also reveals that the influ-
ence of sensitivity depends on the distribution of positive 
cue values across items. The top row of Figure 6 shows 
that when z  1, the less-is-more effect is robust against 
lower levels of sensitivity. However, even here the range of 
experience for which the less-is-more effect is predicted 
to occur is reduced. In the figure, when d Å 2.0, the mid-
dle brother outscores his brother with an expected score 
of 64%. When d   0.5, he would get 58% correct, and 
when d   1.0 he would get 60% correct. In comparison, a 
person who has experienced ne  75 of the objects is pre-
dicted to score 66%, 65%, and 65% correct for d  values 
of 0.5, 1.0, and 2.0, respectively.
Why is the less-is-more effect predicted regardless of 
sensitivity and why does the range of experience where it 
is predicted become restricted when z  1? The answer is 
that judges with intermediate levels of experience (50  
ne  100) have more false alarms and consequently more 
(hit, false alarm) pairs. When z  1, the accuracy for these 
pairs is , which protects judges from their mistaken rec-
ognition decisions. However, z and  are correlated. As 
the proportion of items with positive cue knowledge, z, 
decreases, the probability of a correct inference when 
both items are experienced, , will also decrease. This is 
because the discrimination rule for the knowledge heuris-
tic specifies that the judge guess when neither item has a 
positive cue value. Consequently, the very thing that can 
make the less-is-more effect more probable—less cue 
knowledge and therefore lower knowledge heuristic ac-
curacy—also counteracts it to make it more susceptible to 
a judge’s recognition sensitivity.
Discussion
When presented with a two-alternative forced choice 
task, judges who employ the recognition heuristic first 
look at one item in a pair, decide whether they recognize 
it or not, and then look at the other item in the pair and de-
cide whether they recognize it or not (Goldstein & Giger-
enzer, 2002). If one item is recognized and the other is not, 
then judges can use the recognition heuristic. Integrating 
a signal detection model of recognition memory with the 
recognition heuristic is a first step in understanding how 
recognition memory contributes to the recognition heu-
ristic. Moreover, the integrated model makes it possible 
to assess how experience in the world translates to rec-
ognition serving as an accurate inferential predictor. To 
do so, the implicit assumption that recognition perfectly 
reflects experience was relaxed. That is, when recognizing 
objects, people make false alarms and misses, and these 
errors impact the inferences people make. For example, 
a German professor using recognition to pick teams in 
the 2006 NCAA Division I basketball tournament might 
think that he recognizes Northwestern State—a 14th seed 
in the tournament—and pick it to win a game or two. 
Chances are, however, that this school, located in Natchi-
toches, Louisiana, has been mistaken for a school with 
a similar name located in Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University.14
Expanding the analysis to an inferential test showed 
that as the error rate of recognition increased, the ac-
curacy of the recognition heuristic fell. The errors also 
changed what tool or heuristic was used to answer the test 
questions. Furthermore, the ecologically rational goal for 
judges was shown to be one in which they adjusted their 
recognition response criteria according to their experience 
with the reference class. Finally, the less-is-more effect 
was shown to depend on judges’ sensitivity to the differ-
ence between the familiarity of experienced versus novel 
items as well as the distribution of cue knowledge.
In the discussion that follows, I summarize how the 
signal detection framework makes it possible to assess 
how recognition sensitivity and response rules give rise 
to these errors and interact with the recognition heuris-
tic to produce the observed inferential performance of 
the judge. I also discuss how the model can be used as a 
bridge between the recognition heuristic and other theo-
ries of recognition and how it can be informative for eval-
uating other knowledge heuristics. Finally, I will return 
to Simon’s (1956) principle of bounded rationality and 
address how the signal detection framework can move the 
recognition heuristic closer to this principle.
Recognition sensitivity and response rules. From the 
perspective of theories of recognition memory, when there 
is an ecological correlation in the environment, the covert 
familiarity with objects from the environment can be cor-
related with the target variable of the inferential task. If 
judges want to exploit this correlation with the recognition 
heuristic, they have to transform their familiarity into a bi-
nary recognition decision (see Slegers, Brake, & Doherty, 
2000, for an alternative framework to transform continu-
ous knowledge cues into binary cues). The response rule 
that judges use to make this transformation depends on 
their goals and expectations during the task.
The ecologically rational goal in fast and frugal heu-
ristics is “to exploit the structure of the information in 
the natural environment” (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, 
p. 76). Accordingly, to fully exploit the environmental 
correlation, judges need to adjust their criteria accord-
ing to their level of experience with the reference class: 
When they have little to no experience, judges should 
be the most conservative in recognizing objects; as their 
experience increases, they should become more liberal. 
This Bayesian-observer response strategy (see Wickens, 
2002) minimizes the error rate and allows judges to fully 
exploit the association between their familiarity and the 
inference’s target variable (e.g., city population).
Given this response rule, a judge’s sensitivity to the dif-
ference between experienced and novel items also influ-
ences his ability to exploit this correlation. With perfect 
sensitivity, the recognition validity reflects the validity of 
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the judge’s experience, and with lower sensitivity, the rec-
ognition validity systematically decreases away from the 
validity of experience (A). As a result of this systematic 
change in the recognition validity, the original condition 
of the less-is-more effect still holds, (  ; (Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer, 2002). Instead of changing this condition, the 
signal detection model parses this single condition into 
conditions related to structures of the environment and 
conditions related to the cognitive processes of judges. 
In the environment, the accuracy of experience has to be 
greater than the accuracy achievable when comparing 
objects that have both been experienced,   . At the 
same time, a judge’s sensitivity needs to be high enough 
that recognition based on experience is still more accu-
rate than the knowledge heuristics. For example, in this 
model, when   .8 and   .6, the less-is-more effect 
tends to persist when d   1, regardless of the distribu-
tion of positive cue knowledge, z. A final condition de-
pends on both the environment and the judge: The more 
positive cue knowledge distributed among the objects in 
a reference class, the more robust the less-is-more effect 
against a judge’s recognition errors. Recall, this can occur 
because of the distribution of positive cue values in the 
environment or because of the lack of cue knowledge on 
the part of the judge. In this model, values of z greater 
than approximately .8 tend to counteract lower values of 
sensitivity and maintain the less-is-more effect.
Admittedly, these are less precise criteria than the origi-
nal derivation of (  ;. More precise conditions depend 
on the distributional assumptions of the models. However, 
disentangling the psychological and environmental con-
tributions to the less-is-more effect continues to move 
questions about the recognition heuristic from empirical 
what questions (e.g., “What happens when the recogni-
tion heuristic . . . ?”) toward more theoretically framed why 
questions (e.g.,“Why can recognition make accurate infer-
ences?”). See Wallsten (1996) and Wallsten, Erev, and Bu-
descu (2000) for a similar argument about investigating the 
cognitive processes involved in confidence judgments.
A bridge to theories of recognition memory. The frame-
work can also serve as a bridge to larger and more expanded 
theories of recognition memory, like global memory models 
(Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 2002). The REM global memory 
model (Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997) has the most features in 
common with the signal detection framework that I have 
developed in this article. According to REM, an error-prone 
image or vector of feature values is stored in memory after 
an item has been studied. At retrieval, a probe is generated 
containing the features of the to-be-recognized test item, 
and this probe is matched with all images stored in episodic 
memory to produce a determination of the likelihood that 
the test item has been previously learned. In a manner simi-
lar to how this article describes the response strategy of eco-
logically rational judges, REM then calculates the posterior 
odds that the test item is old and makes a decision on the 
basis of this estimate, just like the response strategy of eco-
logically rational judges using the recognition heuristic.
Besides offering a competing recognition model for 
Schooler and Hertwig’s (2005) ACT–R model of the rec-
ognition heuristic, an REM implementation of the recog-
nition heuristic has potential benefits for both the fast and 
frugal heuristics as well as REM. Although respondents 
can move the criterion to other values, the REM frame-
work usually deals only with a default criterion set at 
equal odds (Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997). Extending REM 
to encompass the ecological framework provides a natural 
prediction that judges adjust their criterion according to 
their prior experience with a reference class. In turn, REM 
can bring a more precise understanding to how judges 
learn sequentially about objects in the environment, de-
velop a familiarity with items via encoding processes, and 
subsequently produce an estimate of an item’s familiarity 
via retrieval processes.
Recognition’s impact on noncompensatory and com-
pensatory heuristics. Since most of the fast and frugal 
implementations of knowledge heuristics make use of the 
recognition principle, the signal detection model of rec-
ognition memory is also informative about their perfor-
mance. Indeed, the analysis has shown that false alarms 
and misses systematically change the expected accuracy 
for noncompensatory rules like “take the best,” “take the 
last,” and “minimalist.”
At the same time, there is recent debate about whether 
judges use noncompensatory single-variable inferential 
rules or more compensatory multiple-variable rules. This 
debate has occurred with regard to recognition (see Bröder 
& Eichler, 2006; Newell & Shanks, 2004; Oppenheimer, 
2003; Pachur & Hertwig, 2006; Pohl, 2006; Richter & 
Spath, 2006) and the knowledge heuristic “take the best” 
(see Bröder, 2000, 2003; Lee & Cummins, 2004; Newell 
& Shanks, 2003). In terms of recognition, the debate is not 
on whether recognition is used as a predictor variable at 
all, but on how it is used to make inferences. If recognition 
is not used in a single variable manner, then other com-
pensatory heuristics, such as tallying, weighted tallying, 
a unit-weight linear model, a weighted linear model, and 
multiple regression, can still use it (Gigerenzer & Gold-
stein, 1996).
Even with these heuristics, however, the use of recog-
nition memory influences their performance if recogni-
tion is used as a predictor variable. This influence occurs 
because, for these heuristics, the response is a function 
of the sum of the cue values. For weighted tallying, the 
weighted linear model, and multiple regression, the cue 
values are typically weighted according to the ecological 
cue validity (see Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Consis-
tently, if recognition is given a weight based on the eco-
logical validity of experience, , then recognition errors 
will have an increasingly detrimental impact on the accu-
racy of these heuristics as  increases. In contrast, tallying 
and the unit-weighting model ascribe equal weights to all 
of the cue values, deemphasizing the contribution of any 
one cue. Consequently, these heuristics will be the most 
robust against recognition errors or, more generally, errors 
in using any other inferential cue.
Conclusion. Using signal detection theory, this article 
has modeled judges’ recognition of objects when they use 
the recognition heuristic to make an inference about the 
objects. The model shows that recognition ability plays 
a crucial role in the performance of the recognition heu-
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ristic and the subsequent heuristics that use it. This is an 
important extension, because the recognition heuristic 
specifically, and fast and frugal heuristics in general, are 
supposed to be constructed according to Simon’s principle 
of bounded rationality, which states: “To describe, predict, 
and explain the behavior of a system of bounded rational-
ity we must both construct a theory of the system’s pro-
cesses and describe the environments to which it is adapt-
ing” (Simon, 1990, p. 6). This principle was developed in 
response to theories of economics being independent of 
the actor and solely a function of the environment. That 
is, theories such as expected utility assume that people 
make choices to maximize their own utility in a given en-
vironment, but ignore the cognitive abilities of the actor. 
The development of the recognition heuristic to date puts 
a great deal of emphasis on the characteristics of the envi-
ronment that make it adaptive. Accounting for the recog-
nition process within the heuristic better heeds the cogni-
tive abilities of judges and moves the model closer to the 
principle of bounded rationality.
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NOTES
1. Spearman correlations are reported for continuity. A more appro-
priate and meaningful measure of association, given the structure of the 
data, may be Kendall’s É (see Gonzalez & Nelson, 1996). According to 
Kendall’s É, the recognition correlation is .43, the ecological correlation 
is .63, and the surrogate correlation is .53.
2. Other integration algorithms do not capitalize on the recognition 
heuristic per se but can use recognition as a cue within their frameworks. 
See Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) for more details.
3. An alternative sampling method would be proportional sampling, in 
which stimuli are sampled from a reference class on the basis of their rel-
ative frequency of occurrence in the environment (Dhami et al., 2004).
4. A necessary assumption for these calculations is that each object in 
the reference class has a unique value on a target variable.
5. The discrimination rate of a heuristic is the relative frequency with 
which the heuristic discriminates between any two objects from the ref-
erence class; it is directly related to the discrimination rate of a cue (see 
Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).
6. This activation level can go under the guise of many labels, such as 
familiarity, strength, confidence, and activation.
7. An alternative use of memory would be consistent with a two-
 alternative forced-choice task (see Wickens, 2002) in which the infer-
ence problem involves determining which of two stimuli (San Antonio 
or San Diego) is more familiar. However, under these forced choice as-
sumptions, the recognition heuristic, along with the entire flow of pro-
cesses shown in Figure 1, breaks down. This is because familiarity, as a 
continuous predictor, would always discriminate between the two alter-
natives, and a judge would never guess or resort to a knowledge heuristic. 
As a result, a judge’s expected accuracy would only be a function of the 
correlation between familiarity and the target variable, and the less-is-
more effect would never be predicted (see Dougherty, Franco-Watkins, 
& Thomas, in press, for such an implementation).
8. More than 10 are possible if more than one distribution character-
izes the familiarity of experienced objects.
9. An alternative and perhaps more appropriate way to make these 
derivations is in terms of relative experience, n/N. To be consistent with 
past work, however, I will continue to make derivations in terms of ab-
solute experience, n.
10. Memory researchers typically find that the distributions tend to 
have unequal variances (see Nelson, 2003; Ratcliff, Gronlund, & Sheu, 
1992). This has no substantial effect on the conclusions reached here.
11. In environments in which each item is not equally likely to occur 
(e.g., in a study using proportional sampling; see note 3), this expres-
sion would change to reflect the nonuniform nature of the distribution. 
Regardless, the general behavior of the response criterion developed here 
would still remain; that is, with increasing experience, a judge would 
adjust the response criterion to be more liberal in recognizing items. 
The adjustment of the criterion, however, would not move in equal in-
tervals and would depend on the distribution of objects in the particular 
environment.
12. The criterion values are centered so that a criterion of 0 lies exactly 
between the two distributions.
13. Other goals are entirely possible and can give rise to different 
predictions. For instance, more conservative responding could go hand 
in hand with more experience if judges were increasingly punished for 
false alarms. Another instance that can lead to conservative responding 
occurs when the response criterion is set fixed but relative to the sig-
nal distribution, and the signal distribution shifts up in familiarity (see 
Hirshman, 1995).
14. Unfortunately for this article and this author, the German pro-
fessor’s error was a benefit. Northwestern State upset the third-seeded 
University of Iowa in their first-round game of the 2006 tournament.
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